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Norwegian Campaign
Operations April to June 1940
Area of Operations
SECRET
Subject: Bombing
Attack on the 18th Cruiser Squadron on 9th April 1940 and
Damage sustained by H.M.S. GLASGOW
From: THE
COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. GLASGOW
Date: 18th
APRIL 1940 No.
0460/017
To: THE VICE
ADMIRAL COMMANDING, EIGHTEEN CRUISER SQUADRON
The following report is submitted,
departmental reports are being forwarded as enclosures.
2. Weather Conditions
Visibility
maximum
Weather –
blue sky with strong sun, cumulus cloud varying in density from 1/10 –
8/10 covered.
Sea –
3-4
Wind –
NE force 5
3. Method of Attack
Between approximately 1430 and 1500, a number of
dive bombing attacks were made by individual aircraft. At 1445, one such attack on H.M.S.
GLASGOW delivered from the starboard quarter resulted in two very near misses
port side. Gunfire was impeded by
the fine angle of approach but the aircraft was engaged by
close range weapons. Ship's course 340 degrees – speed 17 knots.
4. Two bombs of
250 – 500 lbs. Weight were released at a height of about 1500 feet while
still in the dive. It is
considered probable that they fell about 15 feet from the ship's side, one
bursting on impact abreast 70 station and the other under water further
forward.
5. State of ship at 1445
Hands were at Action Stations, all men not required for
fighting the A.A. armament being off the upper deck. All ratings between decks were distributed as far as
possible throughout the ship. The
upward trend of the splinters again being demonstrated the value of men lying
flat on the deck away from the ship's side. Had this not been enforced casualties would have been
greater.
6. Doors,
hatches, and ventilation were in the action state.
7. Damage sustained
A large proportion of the bomb which burst on impact entered
the ship three feet above the lower deck level, holding an area of
approximately six feet by three feet; in addition further penetration of the
ship's side was caused by scattered splinters of varying size numbering about
sixty. A further effect of the
bomb was blast which blew in four dead lights, one of which coming inboard was
responsible for the death of a rating.
Considerable quantities of water entered with movement of the ship, and
the messdecks between 53 – 74 stations were
about one foot under water.
Certain subsidiary flooding occurred and minor underwater damage further
for'd was experienced, probably as a result of the
other bomb.
8. 'A' turret
was temporarily out of action (see Appendix III).
9. Details of
the damage are given in the Appendices.
10. Action Repairs
A good deal of smoke and debris impeded a rapid examination
of the area affected but at 1500 my Executive Officer was able to report that
there was no considerable flooding and by 1515, it had been ascertained that
the lower deck was intact and that there were only very minor leaks below
it. Power had by this time been
restored to ÒAÓ turret.
11. Until a more
complete inspection of the structural damage could be made and the holes
blocked to get flooding under control, a request was made that speed should not
be increased except in case of emergency.
The obvious damage in frames and plates made it doubtful at this time
whether high speed could be possible even when shored.
12. By 1540, a
complete inspection had been made and shoring was well under way. My signal times 1547 reported that the
ship would be ready for service and high speeds in half an hour's time. Shoring was completed and
all important holes blocked by 1700.
13. Work was
then started in building cofferdams of wood and cement round important hatches
on the lower deck, such as lower steering position, to preserve access to them
should the ship go further down by the bow due to further damage or the
displacement of puddings. These
were completed by 2230.
14. That
evening, the ship was steamed at speeds up to 26 knots and the following day 30
knots was maintained for a considerable period.
15. Harbour repairs
On the following day, 10th April, the ship was
ordered to Scapa and plates were prepared on passage to effecting more
permanent repairs.
16. The ship
anchored at 1905, but subsequently nearly two hours' work
were lost due to an air raid.
17. At
midnight, the Base Engineer Officer and Mr. Mackenzie of Metal Industries
estimated that good temporary repairs could be effected
in forty eight hours. Twenty two hours later, the ship proceeded to sea and the
repairs which were done entirely by the ship's staff have stood up to a week of
hard steaming.
18. Casualties
I regret to report the following casualties
Killed
Eric
William Sizer, Acting Leading Signalman, P/JX 138361
Arthur Gudger, Stoker 2nd Class, P/KX 97026
Wounded
Royston
Walter Burrows, Ordinary Signalman, P/SSX 23322 (since died)
Robert Nisbet Milligan, Able Seaman, P/JX 132375
Robert
George Edwards, Able Seaman, P/JX 144393
Ivor Stuart
Lockier,
Signalman, P/JX 145592
David
Cowper Pattie, Ordinary Signalman, P/SSX 25072
19. The wounded
were transferred to H.M. Hospital Ship AMARAPOORA on arrival in
harbour.
20. Recommendations
Detailed recommendations are included in the Appendices, but
the following are most strongly urged:
(a). At least two tons of rapid hardening
cement or alternatively one ton of Portland cement and one ton of
ciment fondu should be carried in
war time.
(b). A supply of tongued and grooved 9" by 3"
deals should be carried for building cofferdams. (These could be made into mess tables to facilitate
stowage).
(c). All water tight hatches situated on the
lower deck which lead to important compartments below should have higher
coamings where possible level to the deck head.
(d). Second Welding set. It is strongly recommended that a second
single point welding set should be carried.
21. Bomb
splinters have been forwarded to the Admiral Commanding, Orkneys and Shetlands,
in accordance with Orkneys and Shetlands General Memorandum No. 249.
22. Copies of
Appendices II and III are being forwarded under separate cover to the Director
of Electrical Engineering, the Director of Naval Construction and the
Captain, H.M.S. VERNON in accordance with C.A.F.O.@s 3376/39 and 2833/39.
Damage Control Organisation
23. The damage
control organisation worked smoothly, and the work of
the repair parties in bringing the ship back to full efficiency so rapidly is
worth of high praise. The direct
credit for this, under my Executive Officer, must go to Lieutenant (E) Horatio
Peter Bowen Evans, Royal Navy, Damage Control Officer, and Mr. Albert Groves,
Warrant Shipwright, Royal Navy.
24. The behaviour of all officers and ratings, both immediately
after the damage occurred and during the subsequent repairs, was
exemplary, and morale was quite unaffected during the subsequent attacks.
25. The energy,
initiative and fine example shown by the following ratings is worthy of special
mention:
Chief
E.R.A. 2nd Class John Edward Milne, P/M 24939
Chief
Stoker Percy John Bowen, P/K 66145
Chief
Shipwright 2nd Class Gilbert Henry Robinson, P/M 15163
Stoker 1st
Class Leslie Price, P/K 95358
26. The whole
of this creditable state of affairs is basically due to the skilled
organisation, cool leadership, and personality of my
Executive Officer, Commander John Wilson Cuthbert, Royal Navy, whole name I
should particularly like to bring to your notice.
(Signed)
F.H. Pegram
CAPTAIN
Appendices:
I
Shipwright
Officer's Report
II
Engine
Room Department Report
III
Electrical
Report
(n.b. these appendices are not included
with my file)
